

ISRAEL & PALESTINE: 20 YEARS AFTER OSLO



As Israelis and Palestinians look back at the 20 years that have elapsed since their leaders signed the Oslo Accords in Washington, there are areas where their perceptions sharply differ, others in which they find agreement, and a few areas where the attitudes of both communities are somewhat conflicted.

DISAGREEMENT

It is clear that several deep differences exist in how each community assesses a number of key issues: (1) which party benefited most from the Accords; (2) why the Accords didn't succeed; (3) how constructive were the roles played by their respective leaderships; (4) their confidence in each other's commitment to a two-state solution; (5) and the role played by the United States in the process.

1. Who benefited from Oslo:

Sixty-eight percent (68%) of Israelis are convinced that Palestinians were the main beneficiaries of Oslo, while 64% of Israelis say that they were harmed by the Accords. On the other side, 75% of Palestinians maintain that the Israelis were Oslo's big winners, with 49% of Palestinians asserting that their interests were harmed by the Accords.

2. Palestinians didn't do enough:

Eighty-nine percent (89%) of Israelis feel that the Palestinians could have done more to make the Accords work, while a plurality of Palestinians feel that their side did everything that was required of them (45% vs. 37% who say they could have done more).

3. Constructive or destructive roles played by Israeli and Palestinian leaders:

Palestinians give very high marks to the constructive roles played by their leadership: Arafat (90%), Abbas

(81%), and Fayyad (66%). They give positive but lower scores to the roles played by Hamas' leadership (in the mid-50% range).

Israelis, on the other hand, give lower grades to the constructive roles played by their leaders: Rabin (69%), Peres (65%), and Sharon (50%). Pluralities of Israelis view some of their other leaders as playing destructive roles: Netanyahu (47%) and Barak (48%).

No Palestinian leader is seen as constructive by Israelis and no Israeli leader is seen as constructive by Palestinians.

4. Confidence in each other's commitment to peace:

Fifty percent (50%) of Palestinians are confident that their society is committed to a two-state solution, but believe that only 26% of Israelis are committed to this goal. On the other hand, 57% of Israelis say they are committed to a two-state solution, but believe that only 28% of Palestinians share this goal.

5. The role of the United States:

A majority of Palestinians see the role of every U.S. president since the Oslo signing as destructive: Clinton (58%), Bush (73%), and Obama (70%). Conversely, majorities or pluralities of Israelis see the role of these U.S. presidents as constructive: Clinton (68%), Bush (54%), and Obama (45%).

AGREEMENT

There are areas where Israelis and Palestinians find agreement. Both parties acknowledge: (6) that they were hopeful when the Accords were signed, but have since lost hope; (7) that Oslo was not a positive development in their relationship; and (8) that in their assessment a two-state solution is not even a feasible solution at this time. They also agree: that (9) Israel and (10) the United

States didn't do enough to make Oslo work; that (11) Palestinian and Israeli violence or use of force contributed to reducing their collective confidence in the prospects for peace; and (12) that the failure of Camp David harmed the process.

6. Hopeful at the beginning:

Majorities of both Palestinians (61%) and Israelis (54%) say that they were hopeful when the Accords were signed.

7. Twenty years later, Oslo was not a positive development:

Twenty years later only 18% of Palestinians and 19% of Israelis view Oslo as a positive development in the history of their relationship.

8. A two-state solution is desirable but no longer feasible:

Both Israelis and Palestinians agree that a two-state solution is a desirable outcome—with a plurality of 47% of Palestinians and 74% of Israelis agreeing.

Both sides also maintain that they are confident that their side is interested in “a just and lasting two-state solution—with 50% of Palestinians and 57% of Israelis agreeing. Both sides, however, maintain the belief that the other side is not committed.

But only (34%) of Palestinians and (36%) of Israelis now see a two-state solution as feasible.

9. Israelis could have done more:

Israelis and Palestinians may disagree as to whether Palestinians did enough to make Oslo work, but both sides agree that Israel did not do enough – with 59% of Palestinians and 49% of Israelis concurring.

10. The United States also could have done more:

Both Palestinians (57%) and Israelis (63%) agree that the United States could have done more to make the Accords work.

11. Violence from both sides reduced confidence in peace:

Majorities or strong pluralities of both Israelis and Palestinians agree that their violent actions or use of force contributed to reducing their confidence in the prospect for peace, including: suicide bombings, rocket fire from Gaza, the second Intifada, the election of Hamas, settlement construction, Israel's reconquest of the West Bank, the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, and Baruch Goldstein's massacre of Palestinians in Hebron. All of this indicates a shared understanding of the negative role played by violence or the use of force in sapping their confidence in the prospect of peace.

12. Failure at Camp David harmed the prospects for peace:

Sixty-two percent (62%) of both Palestinians and Israelis said that the impasse at Camp David reduced their confidence in the peace process.

CONFLICTED

There are other areas where the reactions of Israelis and Palestinians are somewhat conflicted or ambivalent. For example, respondents display a mixture of positive and negative attitudes toward: (13) the Arab Peace Initiative; (14) the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza; (15) and the current negotiations initiated by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.

13. Arab Peace Initiative:

Both Palestinians and Israelis are split in their attitudes toward the Arab Peace Initiative. Thirty-eight (38%) of Palestinians say it reduced their confidence in the peace process, while 37% said it strengthened their commitment to the peace process. For Israelis it was 30% to 42%.

14. Withdrawal from Gaza:

The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and removal of Gaza settlements reduced the confidence of 45% of

Palestinians, but 38% said this strengthened their commitment to peace. Forty-eight percent (48%)—of Israelis say this development reduced their confidence, while 41% say it strengthened their commitment to the prospect of peace.

15. Current negotiations:

Secretary Kerry's effort doesn't receive a resounding endorsement from the Palestinians. Only a slight plurality of Palestinians (41%) say they are either hopeful it might work or are at least willing to wait and see what the outcome will be. At the same time, 39% of Israelis are hopeful and 40% are willing to wait for the outcome.

And 49% of Palestinians and 55% of Israelis say they are inclined to support an agreement if it is endorsed by their leaders—with only 28% of Palestinians and 19% of Israelis saying that they will reject it even if their leadership say otherwise.

CONCLUSION

From the results of this poll, it is clear that the past 20 years have taken a toll on the confidence both Palestinians and Israelis have in the peace process that began with the 1993 signing of the Oslo Accords, and

the trust each side has in the other's commitment to peace. Both sides admit that many of their own actions have contributed to creating this negative environment. This may be one of the most positive signs emerging from the results of this poll.

The Palestinian and Israeli leaders engaged in the current round of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, therefore, face a real challenge. They must produce an agreement that will be accepted by wary publics on both sides, and they must be able to convince their constituents that this peace process will be different.

Unlike our 2012 Sir Bani Yas survey of Israeli and Palestinian public opinion, this year's poll did not explore, in any detail, what the parties will or will not accept, at this point, in a final or interim peace agreement. These questions require future survey work.

But what this year's results do establish is that finding a solution is more difficult not only because physical conditions have made map-drawing more complicated. The ground today is also less fertile than it was the first time around, having been polluted during the past 20 years by the ill-will created and negative behaviors of both sides that sapped confidence and trust of both Palestinians and Israelis.

A Note on "Age":

In reporting the poll results, we used age as the principal metric with which to compare the responses of Israelis and Palestinians. We did so for two reasons. First, after reviewing all of the data, age was the only demographic characteristic that appeared to make a measurable difference. And second, we thought it would be relevant to compare the views of those older Israelis and Palestinians who were "of age" at the time of the signing of the Accords and had, therefore, direct personal experience of the events of the past two decades with the views of their younger compatriots whose information about Oslo and the years after the signing are based on "received knowledge."

Using age as the metric, we note that younger Israelis, those under 34 years of age (34% of the sample), consistently demonstrate more hardline views than do older Israelis. By 15 to 20 points, those under 34 years old are more negative about Oslo, about Palestinians, and about the prospects for peace. On the other side, we find that the views of younger Palestinians (51% of the sample) more closely track the attitudes of those who are more than 34 years old. When, however, there are differences, we often find younger Palestinians more positively inclined toward peace.



As you recall your feelings in 1993 at the time of the signing of the Oslo Accords, how hopeful were you back then that there would be a resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict?		
	Palestinians (age: 34+)	Israelis (age: 34+)
Hopeful	61	54
Not hopeful	28	37
Do not recall	12	10

A majority of Palestinians (61%) and Israelis (54%) age 34 and over (who were, therefore, at least 14 years old in 1993) recall feeling hopeful that there would be a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the time of the signing of the Oslo Accords. Just under one-third of Palestinians (28%) and just over one-third of Israelis (37%) in this age group say they were not hopeful in 1993 that the conflict would be resolved. These numbers closely reflect the polling data available from 1993 when, for example, 60% of Palestinians said they thought the Accords were a realistic step leading toward a Palestinian state¹ and 61% of Israelis supported the agreement.²

Given what you have heard about the Oslo Accords signed between Israelis and Palestinians in 1993, how positive a development was that agreement in the search for peace?		
	Palestinians (age: 18–33)	Israelis (age: 18–33)
Positive	65	34
Not positive	26	52
Do not know	9	15

When younger Palestinian and Israeli respondents (those between 18 and 33) are asked about what they have heard about the Oslo Accords, a divide is evident. Almost two-thirds (65%) of younger Palestinians believe that the agreement was a positive development in the search for peace, while just one-third (34%) of younger Israelis agree.

Comparing the reactions of those who lived through Oslo and those who have only heard about it as they have grown up, it is worth noting that while the attitudes of younger Palestinians track older Palestinians, younger and older Israelis hold opposite views (younger: 34% positive vs. 52% not positive; older: 54% hopeful vs. 37% not hopeful). This establishes a pattern that plays out throughout the survey, with Palestinian attitudes consistent across age groups and younger Israelis expressing more hardline views than their elders.

1 Jerusalem Media and Communications Center. (September, 1993). Public Opinion Poll No. 3: On Palestinian Attitudes on PLO-Israel Agreement, September 19-21, 1993. <http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=503>

2 Poll was conducted by Mina Zemach of the Dahaf Research Institute and its results were published in *Yediot Achronot*. See Leon, Dan. (1995). Israeli public opinion polls on the peace process. *Palestine-Israel Journal*, 2(1). <http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=676>

In the period right after the signing of the agreement between Arafat and Rabin, do you recall taking any action expressing your support for or against the agreement?		
	Palestinians (age: 34+)	Israelis (age: 34+)
Participated in a demonstration in support of the Israeli-Palestinian accords	8	5
Wrote an article or a letter in support of the accords	5	1
Spoke publicly in favor of the accord	10	13
Engaged in a joint Israeli/Palestinian effort to show support for peace	5	2
Participated in a demonstration in opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian accords	5	5
Wrote an article or a letter in opposition to the accords	2	2
Spoke publicly in opposition to the accords	6	7
I did not engage in any activity either for or against the accords.	51	68
Not sure	14	5

There are slightly more actions reported by Palestinians in support of the Accords than by Israelis, while the percentages of those reporting actions in opposition to the agreement are about the same. Among those who were at least 14 in 1993, 51% of Palestinian respondents and 68% of Israeli respondents did not engage in any activity either for or against the Accords in the period immediately following the Oslo signing.

Looking back at the last 20 years, did the Israelis benefit from the Oslo Accords, or were they harmed by this agreement?						
	Palestinians			Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Benefited	75	76	74	24	18	27
Harmed	14	15	12	64	72	60
Not sure	12	9	14	12	10	13

Looking back at the last 20 years, did the Palestinians benefit from the Oslo Accords, or were they harmed by this agreement?						
	Palestinians			Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Benefited	40	41	38	68	71	66
Harmed	49	51	47	19	17	20
Not sure	11	7	14	14	12	15

Three-quarters of Palestinian respondents feel that Israelis benefited from the Oslo Accords, while just 14% say Israelis were harmed. Just 40% of Palestinians say their own community has benefited from the agreement, while half

say they have been harmed (49%). Among Palestinians there is very little difference in opinion between younger and older respondents; this is common throughout the survey.

On the other hand, only one-quarter of Israelis (24%) say they have benefited from Oslo, while 64% say they have been harmed by it. Conversely, 68% of Israeli respondents believe Palestinians were the beneficiaries of the agreement and just 19% think that community was harmed by it. Among Israelis younger respondents are more likely to see the Oslo Accords as a negative for Israel; this is also seen throughout the survey.

Looking back at the 20 years since the Oslo Accords were signed, did each of the following groups do everything that was required of them to make the Accords work, or could they have done more to make them work?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Israelis	Did everything that was required of them	20	19	20	40	49	36
	Could have done more	59	58	59	49	35	56
	Not sure	22	23	21	11	16	8
Palestinians	Did everything that was required of them	45	43	47	2	2	2
	Could have done more	37	40	33	89	84	91
	Not sure	18	17	20	10	15	7
The United States	Did everything that was required of them	18	23	12	17	16	17
	Could have done more	57	54	59	63	57	66
	Not sure	26	23	30	20	26	17

Respondents were asked to consider if Israelis, Palestinians, and the United States each did everything that was required of them to make the Oslo Accords work or if they could have done more.

Twenty percent of Palestinians think that Israelis did everything required, while twice as many Israelis (40%) say they did everything they could to make the Accords work. But 49% of Israelis acknowledge that they could have done more, an opinion shared by 59% of Palestinians. Interestingly, among older Israeli respondents, 56% say they could have done more to make Oslo work, compared to just 35% of respondents ages 18-33.

With respect to Palestinian efforts to make the Accords work, while 45% of Palestinians say they did everything required of them, just 2% of Israelis agree. On this question, younger Palestinians appear more critical of their own community, with 43% saying they did everything they could but 40% saying they could have done more. Older Israelis are the most emphatic (91%) that Palestinians could have done more to make the agreement work.

Considering the efforts of the United States, Palestinians and Israelis agree that the United States did not do everything required of it to make the Accords work. Just 18% of Palestinians and 17% of Israelis think U.S. efforts met this standard, while 57% of Palestinians and 63% of Israelis think the U.S. efforts could have gone further to make the agreement work.

At this point, how hopeful are you that an Israeli/Palestinian peace is possible?						
	Palestinians			Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Hopeful	39	38	40	35	25	39
Not hopeful	57	57	57	64	74	59
Not sure	4	5	3	1	0	2

At this point, among both Palestinians and Israelis, hope is in short supply. Thirty-nine percent (39%) of Palestinian respondents and 35% of Israeli respondents say they are hopeful that an Israeli-Palestinian peace is possible, while 57% of Palestinians and 64% of Israelis are not hopeful. Hopefulness is lowest among younger Israelis, among whom 25% are hopeful and 74% are not.

Given the following events that occurred during the past 20 years, how significant an impact has each of them had on your outlook toward the prospects for peace?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Baruch Goldstein's massacre of Arab worshipers at the Ibrahim Mosque in 1994	Reduced confidence	75	72	78	57	52	59
	Strengthened commitment	11	10	11	18	11	20
The closure of Jerusalem in 1993	Reduced confidence	65	55	75	37	29	41
	Strengthened commitment	11	17	5	13	10	15
Suicide bombers striking inside Israel	Reduced confidence	65	63	68	84	89	82
	Strengthened commitment	15	15	14	11	5	14
The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995	Reduced confidence	59	51	66	56	53	58
	Strengthened commitment	18	25	11	20	12	23
The election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister in 1996	Reduced confidence	66	63	69	50	40	54
	Strengthened commitment	10	12	9	24	24	24
The construction of Har Homa on Jabal Abu Ghneim	Reduced confidence	66	61	71	42	30	48
	Strengthened commitment	6	6	7	16	13	17
The Wye River Agreements in 1998	Reduced confidence	45	41	50	33	31	33
	Strengthened commitment	16	14	18	26	15	31
The impasse at Camp David in 2000	Reduced confidence	62	57	68	62	53	66
	Strengthened commitment	8	8	9	13	9	14
The Second Intifada	Reduced confidence	76	76	76	82	85	80
	Strengthened commitment	17	16	17	12	6	15
Israeli military retaking the West Bank in 2002	Reduced confidence	84	84	84	53	49	54
	Strengthened commitment	7	7	7	26	25	27

Given the following events that occurred during the past 20 years, how significant an impact has each of them had on your outlook toward the prospects for peace?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002	Reduced confidence	38	37	40	33	30	34
	Strengthened commitment	37	39	35	36	29	39
The death of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat	Reduced confidence	81	79	83	30	29	30
	Strengthened commitment	11	12	11	42	42	42
The election of Hamas in 2006	Reduced confidence	66	67	65	75	72	76
	Strengthened commitment	14	13	16	13	10	14
The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the removal of Gaza's settlements	Reduced confidence	45	43	47	48	58	44
	Strengthened commitment	38	41	35	41	32	46
The construction of the West Bank barrier	Reduced confidence	76	75	77	43	45	42
	Strengthened commitment	9	9	9	37	30	40
Rocket fire from Gaza and the Israeli/Gaza war of 2008/9	Reduced confidence	74	74	73	82	86	81
	Strengthened commitment	16	15	16	13	8	14
The reelection of Barack Obama as president of the United States in 2012, and his 2013 visits to Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem	Reduced confidence	59	56	62	40	41	39
	Strengthened commitment	20	23	16	33	28	35

We asked respondents to consider a series of events that have occurred in the 20 years since the Oslo Accords were signed and tell us how significant an impact each of them has had on their outlook toward the prospects for peace. For each event, they told us if the event had reduced their confidence in or had strengthened their commitment to peace, or if they did not recall it. For each side, a number of patterns emerge from these responses.

“Those most likely to reduce Palestinian confidence in the prospects for peace were events that represented an intensification of occupation.”

On the Palestinian side, all of the events in question were more likely to reduce their confidence in peace than to strengthen their commitment to peace. Those most likely to reduce Palestinian confidence in the prospects for peace were events that represented an intensification of occupation—for example, the Israeli military re-occupying the West Bank in 2002 (84%), the construction of the West Bank barrier (76%), the massacre of 29 Muslim worshippers by Baruch Goldstein in 1994 (75%), construction of Har Homa on Jabal Abu Ghneim (66%), and the closure of Jerusalem in 1993 (65%). For each of these events, the differential between Palestinian and Israeli responses is significant, with the number of Israelis saying they reduced confidence in the prospects for peace 18 to 33 points lower (e.g., only 43% of Israelis say the construction of the West Bank barrier reduced their confidence in peace).

The death of Arafat also had a very significant impact on Palestinian confidence in the possibilities for peace (81% say it reduced their confidence in peace); this is likely because of his central role as a revered leader and a symbol of

“*Israelis are most likely to see violence and threats to their security as most significant in diminishing their confidence in peace.*”

Palestinian national aspirations. However, this event was the most positive for Israelis, with 42% saying it strengthened their commitment to peace and just 30% saying it reduced their confidence in the prospects for peace.

Israelis are most likely to see violence and threats to their security as most significant in diminishing their

confidence in peace. For example, at least eight in ten respondents say that suicide bombers striking inside Israel (84%), the Second Intifada (82%), and rocket fire from Gaza and the Israeli-Gaza war in 2008-2009 (82%) reduced their confidence in peace. Palestinians also felt these events reduced their confidence in peace, particularly the Second Intifada (76%) and the Israeli-Gaza war (74%).

Events related directly to the peace process itself often have had a similar impact on the views of Palestinians and Israelis. For example, the Camp David impasse in 2000 reduced confidence in peace for 62% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis; the assassination of Rabin was deemed significant by majorities of both sides (Palestinians: 59%; Israelis: 56%). The Wye River Agreements of 1998 reduced Palestinian confidence in peace for 45% of respondents, while only 33% of Israeli respondents agreed; however, this event seems largely forgotten, with 29% of both sides saying they do not recall this event, including 43% of younger Israelis and 36% of younger Palestinians.

The elections of those hostile to the peace process were seen as reducing confidence in peace, though with greater intensity by those on the other side. For example, the election of Netanyahu as prime minister of Israel in 1996 reduced the confidence of 50% of Israelis and 66% of Palestinians in the prospects for peace, while the election of Hamas in 2006 made 65% of Palestinians and 75% of Israelis feel that peace was less likely.

There were very mixed reactions on both sides to two additional events: the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the removal of Gaza settlements in 2005 and the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, with relatively high numbers of respondents saying these events strengthened their commitment to peace. Among Palestinians 45% say the Gaza evacuation reduced their confidence in peace, while 38% say their commitment to peace was strengthened. On the Israeli side, 48% say the withdrawal reduced confidence and 41% say it strengthened their commitment to peace. Thirty-seven percent (37%) of Palestinians and 36% of Israelis say the Arab Peace Initiative strengthened their commitment to peace, while 38% of Palestinians and 33% of Israelis say it reduced their confidence in the prospects for peace.

Finally, the re-election of Barack Obama as U.S. president in 2012 and his subsequent visits to Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Bethlehem in 2013 were not particularly positive, with 59% of Palestinians and 40% of Israelis saying they diminished their confidence in peace.

One additional observation here is that a significant portion of respondents, particularly younger Israelis, do not recall some of these events in the 20 years since Oslo. Among these Israelis under age 34, 48% do not recall the closure of Jerusalem in 1993, 43% do not recall Wye, 32% do not recall the construction of Har Homa, 27% do not recall the Camp David impasse of 2000, 25% do not recall the Arab Peace Initiative, and 19% do not recall the Hebron massacre by Baruch Goldstein in 1994. Given their extremely negative view about the prospects for peace today (74% say they are not hopeful about Israeli-Palestinian peace being achieved), their lack of knowledge about some of these important events is troubling.

“*...a significant portion of respondents, particularly younger Israelis, do not recall some of these events in the 20 years since Oslo.*”

The role played by the following figures in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since Oslo?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Yitzhak Rabin	Constructive	33	32	34	69	55	75
	Destructive	53	53	53	24	33	20
Shimon Peres	Constructive	16	16	16	65	50	72
	Destructive	72	71	74	25	33	22
Benjamin Netanyahu	Constructive	11	11	12	41	46	38
	Destructive	81	81	81	47	41	49
Ehud Barak	Constructive	11	12	9	34	28	36
	Destructive	80	78	82	48	50	47
Ariel Sharon	Constructive	10	11	9	50	39	54
	Destructive	83	81	85	42	52	37
Ehud Olmert	Constructive	13	13	12	39	25	45
	Destructive	77	76	78	37	41	36
Tzipi Livni	Constructive	17	16	19	40	23	47
	Destructive	66	69	64	30	38	26
Yasser Arafat	Constructive	90	90	90	17	14	18
	Destructive	8	7	8	70	69	70
Mahmoud Abbas	Constructive	81	81	81	16	10	19
	Destructive	13	12	14	54	52	56
Salam Fayyad	Constructive	66	65	67	16	11	19
	Destructive	21	21	21	43	43	43
Ismail Haniyeh	Constructive	58	55	60	5	3	5
	Destructive	24	27	22	71	67	73
Khaled Meshal	Constructive	53	49	57	4	5	4
	Destructive	29	32	26	69	62	72
King Hussein	Constructive	53	50	57	55	35	64
	Destructive	34	36	32	19	30	13
Bill Clinton	Constructive	31	31	31	68	56	73
	Destructive	58	58	57	16	21	14
George W. Bush	Constructive	14	14	14	54	46	57
	Destructive	73	73	73	21	24	20
Barack Obama	Constructive	15	15	15	45	39	48
	Destructive	70	69	70	34	38	32

Respondents were then asked about the role of Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. leaders in the peace process since Oslo. In general, Palestinians view Israeli leaders with extreme skepticism, with majorities finding all of them destructive to the peace process. Yitzhak Rabin has the highest ratings among Palestinians, and still only one-third see his role

as constructive, while 53% say it was destructive. Israelis have an equally dim view of Palestinian leadership, with just 17% saying Arafat was constructive to the peace process and ratings diminishing from there. Large numbers of younger Israelis, in particular, are not familiar with Palestinian leaders and their roles in the peace process, including Fayyad (39%), Abbas (31%), and Meshal (27%).

When considering their own leaders, respondents have far more positive views. Nine in ten Palestinian respondents say Arafat was constructive to the peace process, and 81% say Abbas has been constructive too. Majorities say Fayyad (66%), Haniyeh (58%), and Meshal (53%) have also aided the cause of peace. Majorities of Israelis view Rabin (69%), Peres (65%), and Sharon (50%) as constructive to peace, and pluralities say Livni (40%) and Olmert (39%) have also been constructive. Among Israelis, Netanyahu and Barak, however, are more likely to be seen as destructive to the peace process (47% and 48%, respectively) than as constructive (41% and 34%, respectively). There are significant differences between older and younger Israelis with respect to their views of their own leaders, with younger Israelis less likely to see them as playing constructive roles in the peace process.

Majorities of both Palestinians (53%) and Israelis (55%) view King Hussein as having played a constructive role in the peace process. Among older Israelis, 64% say Hussein was constructive to peace, while only 35% of younger Israelis agree.

In considering American leadership, Israelis rate former President Clinton (68%) most constructive to peace, with diminishing ratings for former President Bush (54%) and President Obama (45%). Palestinians also see U.S. presidents becoming increasingly less constructive, though their ratings start at a significantly lower level (Clinton: 31%, Bush: 14%, and Obama: 15%).

Since Oslo, which of the following has happened to you personally?			
	Palestinians		
	Total	Young	Old
I have a family member or close friend who was killed or wounded by Israeli soldiers or settlers	20	18	22
I was wounded by Israeli soldiers or settlers	6	6	7
I have a family member or close friend who was imprisoned by Israel	23	20	26
I was imprisoned by Israel	7	5	9
I have had land or property confiscated or destroyed by Israeli authorities or settlers	11	12	11

Since Oslo, which of the following has happened to you personally?			
	Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old
I have a family member or close friend who was killed or wounded by Palestinian violence	21	32	16
I have been wounded by Palestinian violence	2	5	1
I have a family member or close friend who was forced to abandon their home	18	25	15
I was forced to abandon my home	2	3	2

About one in five Palestinians and Israelis say they have a family member or close friend who was killed or wounded by the other side in the conflict since Oslo. Younger Israelis are twice as likely as older Israelis to say they have been impacted in this way (32% vs. 16%). In addition, six percent of Palestinians say they have personally been wounded by Israeli soldiers or settlers, while 2% of Israelis say they have been wounded by Palestinian violence.

Among Palestinians, 23% say they have a family member or close friend who has been imprisoned by Israel and 7% say they themselves have been imprisoned in the last 20 years.

We also asked respondents to consider the impact of the conflict since Oslo on the homes and property of Palestinians and Israelis. Eleven percent (11%) of Palestinian respondents have had land or property confiscated or destroyed by Israeli authorities or settlers. Among Israelis, 18% say they have a family member or close friend who was forced to abandon their home and 2% say this has happened to them personally. Again, younger Israelis are far more likely than older Israelis to say they know someone who has had to abandon their home (25% vs. 15%).

In your opinion in evaluating the past two decades, should the Oslo Agreement be seen as a positive or negative development in the history of the Israeli/Palestinian relationship?						
	Palestinians			Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Positive	18	14	23	19	12	22
Negative	37	35	40	37	48	32
It made no difference	22	22	22	37	40	31

Fewer than one in five Palestinians (18%) and Israelis (19%) think that the Oslo Agreement should be seen as a positive development in the history of Israeli-Palestinian relations. On both sides, those ages 18 to 33 are less likely than those 34 and over to see Oslo as a positive (Palestinians: 14% vs. 23%, Israelis: 12% vs. 22%). Almost twice as many respondents on both sides view Oslo as a negative development (Palestinians: 37%, Israelis: 37%), and Israelis are equally likely to say that Oslo has made no difference in the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians (37%). About one in five Palestinians say that Oslo has made no difference (22%).

How would each of the following affect your confidence?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
The Palestinians commit to non-violence and take steps to control any violent elements	Make me confident	35	30	41	50	47	51
	Make me less confident	33	31	34	14	15	14
	No effect on my confidence	16	17	14	32	30	35
The Israelis commit to end all new settlement construction	Make me confident	31	33	28	30	26	32
	Make me less confident	36	32	41	33	36	32
	No effect on my confidence	15	13	18	30	30	30
The Palestinians accept Israel as a Jewish State	Make me confident	6	5	7	68	65	69
	Make me less confident	22	20	23	10	10	10
	No effect on my confidence	51	49	53	17	16	20

How would each of the following affect your confidence?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
The Israelis accept negotiations based on the 1967 borders	Make me confident	24	26	22	26	18	29
	Make me less confident	36	32	40	51	57	48
	No effect on my confidence	17	16	18	15	15	17
The US were to present a clear peace plan for two states based on the Clinton Parameters and the Arab Peace Initiative and were to commit to put its full weight and guarantee behind its implementation	Make me confident	24	26	23	37	27	42
	Make me less confident	32	30	34	31	34	30
	No effect on my confidence	21	19	22	20	17	25

For Palestinians, there is little that could make them more confident in the peace process. About one-third of Palestinians would be more confident in peace and another third would be less confident in peace: if Palestinians committed to non-violence and took steps to control violent elements (35% vs. 33%) and if Israelis committed to ending all new settlement construction (31% vs. 36%). The scales tip toward being less confident with respect to Israel accepting negotiations based on the 1967 borders (more/less: 24%/36%) and the United States presenting a clear plan and committing fully to its implementation (24%/32%). Finally, a majority of Palestinians (51%) think that accepting Israel as a Jewish state would have no effect on their confidence in peace.

On the Israeli side, majorities believe that certain Palestinian actions would make them more confident in peace. If Palestinians accepted Israel as a Jewish state (the option that moves the needle the least for Palestinians), 68% of Israelis say they would be more confident in peace. And a Palestinian commitment to nonviolence coupled with steps to control violent elements would make 50% of Israelis more confident. U.S. involvement in the peace process and Israel's ending new settlement construction bring about more divided conclusions, with about a third saying they would be more and a third saying they would be less confident. Israel's accepting the 1967 borders as the basis for negotiations only makes 26% say they would be more confident, while it would make a majority (51%) feel less confident in the prospects for peace.

In your opinion, how desirable is it to have a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?						
	Palestinians			Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Desirable	47	45	48	74	57	81
Undesirable	40	37	44	23	38	16

In your opinion, at this point in time, how feasible is it to achieve a two-state solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict?						
	Palestinians			Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Feasible	34	32	35	36	25	41
Unfeasible	54	49	58	62	74	56

Overall, both sides are more likely to see a two-state solution as desirable than undesirable, though Israelis (74% vs. 23%) are far more positive about this than Palestinians (47% vs. 40%). Older Israelis are particularly in favor of this solution (81%), while younger Israelis are less enthusiastic (57%).

“...majorities (54% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis) think a two-state solution is not feasible.”

Despite this belief in the desirability of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, only about one-third of Palestinians and Israelis feel that such a solution is feasible at this point, while majorities (54% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis) think a two-state solution is not feasible. On the Palestinian side, there is little difference based on age; however, among Israelis, younger respondents are less likely to see two states as a feasible solution at this time (25%) compared to older respondents (41%).

How confident are you that the following group is interested in a just and lasting two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Israeli public	Confident	26	24	28	57	45	62
	Not confident	59	56	62	40	50	35
Palestinian public	Confident	50	46	54	28	21	32
	Not confident	35	35	36	68	75	65

Both Israelis and Palestinians are skeptical that the other side in the conflict is interested in a just and lasting two-state solution. Majorities on both sides say they are confident that their own community is interested in this solution (Israelis: 57%, Palestinians: 50%), while only one-quarter of respondents are confident that the other side is interested in such an outcome (Israelis: 28%, Palestinians: 26%). Younger Israelis are less confident that the Israeli public wants a two-state solution (45%) than older Israelis (62%).

How confident are you that each of the following groups is interested in a just and lasting two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Government of Benjamin Netanyahu	Confident	19	19	18	32	27	35
	Not confident	65	60	70	63	66	61
Government of Mahmoud Abbas	Confident	48	46	51	14	13	14
	Not confident	36	33	40	80	77	81
Obama Administration	Confident	20	20	19	45	36	48
	Not confident	65	59	72	49	54	47

This lack of confidence in the other side is even more pronounced when considering the commitments of the Israeli and Palestinian governments. More than six in ten respondents on both sides are not confident that the Netanyahu government is committed to a just and lasting two-state solution (Palestinians: 65%, Israelis: 63%). One-third of Israelis (32%) are confident in their government’s commitment; only 19% of Palestinians agree.

And while almost half of Palestinians (48%) are confident that the government of Mahmoud Abbas is committed to a two-state solution, 80% of Israeli respondents say they are not confident that the Abbas government is committed to this outcome.

There is also little confidence in the commitment of the U.S. government. Israelis are twice as likely as Palestinians to be confident in the Obama administration's commitment to a just and lasting two-state solution, with 45% of Israelis and just 20% of Palestinians expressing this. Younger Israelis, however, are less likely than older Israelis to feel confident in the U.S. government's commitment to a two-state solution (36% vs. 48%).

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has re-launched Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. How hopeful are you that these negotiations will produce an agreement that will lead to an Israeli-Palestinian peace?						
	Palestinians			Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
I am hopeful	11	9	13	39	26	45
I am not hopeful	40	40	39	16	24	12
I am willing to wait and see what the outcome will be	31	29	32	40	42	39

There is very little hope among Palestinians that the talks recently re-launched by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will produce an agreement leading to a resolution of the conflict. Just 11% of Palestinian respondents say they are hopeful, while 40% say they are not hopeful and 31% say they will wait and see. On the Israeli side, 39% are hopeful that these new talks will give rise to an agreement that will lead to an Israeli-Palestinian peace; 16% say they are not hopeful and 40% want to wait and see.

If an agreement is reached and is endorsed by President Abbas, would you be inclined to support this agreement?			
	Palestinians		
	Total	Young	Old
I would support a peace agreement if it was endorsed by President Abbas	49	55	43
I would not support a peace agreement even if it was endorsed by President Abbas	28	28	28

If an agreement is reached and is endorsed by Prime Minister Netanyahu, would you be inclined to support this agreement?			
	Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old
I would support a peace agreement if it was endorsed by PM Netanyahu	55	39	63
I would not support a peace agreement even if it was endorsed by PM Netanyahu	19	33	13

Among both Palestinians and Israelis, about half (Palestinians: 49%, Israelis: 55%) say they would support a peace agreement if it was endorsed by their leader, Palestinian President Abbas or Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. On the Palestinian side, younger respondents are more likely to say they would support such an agreement than older respondents (55% vs. 43%). But among Israelis, the reverse is true, with 39% of younger respondents and 63% of older respondents saying they would support a peace agreement if it was endorsed by Netanyahu.

APPENDIX —METHODODOLOGY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

Methodology

The approach used for conducting the poll involved face-to-face, in-home personal interviews of 1,000 Israeli adults and 1,000 Palestinian adults during the month of August 2013. A multi-stage sampling methodology was employed for selection of respondents. The sample obtained was nationally representative and comprised adult males and females, who were 18+ years of age. Based on a confidence interval of 95%, the margin of error for 1,000 is +/- [3.2] percentage points. This means that all other things being equal, the identical survey repeated will have results within the margin of error 95 times out of 100.

Throughout the analysis, data in the tables may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of “not sure” are not shown. In addition, for the purposes of analysis and data presentation, some responses have been aggregated. For example, responses of “very constructive” and “somewhat constructive” are aggregated into “Constructive,” while responses of “somewhat destructive” and “very destructive” are aggregated into “Destructive.”

Demographics

Israelis

Born in Israel	81
Emigrated to Israel before 1993	16
Emigrated to Israel after 1992	3
Male	50
Female	50
Secular	61
Traditional	18
Religious	12
Orthodox	8
Other	1
18-33	34
34+	66

Palestinians

City	73
Village	18
Refugee camp	10
Male	49
Female	51
Secular	4
Pious	58
Traditionalist	37
18-33	51
34+	49



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